**Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences** ISSN(o): 2581-6241
Monthly, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed, Indexed Journal Impact Factor: 9.134
Volume - 9, Issue - 8, August - 2026

DOIs:10.2018/SS/202608001 --:-- Research Paper / Article / Review

# Antyodaya and Inclusive Development: Tracing the Ancient Roots of a Modern Policy Principle from Ramayana and Mahabharata to Deendayal Upadhyaya

**Mool Raj[1], Prof. Inder Singh Thakur[2]**
[1]ICSSR Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Deendayal Upadhyay Studies, Central University of Himachal Pradesh (CUHP, India
[2]Professor, Centre for Deendayal Upadhyay Studies, Central University of Himachal Pradesh (CUHP), India
Email - sundhurishu@gmail.com

**Abstract:** The concept of Antyodaya—the rise of the last and most marginalised person in society—occupies a central place in the political philosophy of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and constitutes one of his most enduring contributions to Indian social and political thought. This paper argues that Antyodaya is not an innovation without precedent but rather the modern policy articulation of a welfare ideal deeply embedded in the Rajadharma tradition of the Ramayana and Mahabharata. Through a close reading of primary textual sources—particularly the ideal of Ramarajya in the Valmiki Ramayana, the welfare maxims of the Mahabharata's Shantiparva, and Upadhyaya's foundational lectures on Integral Humanism—this study traces a continuous philosophical lineage connecting ancient conceptions of praja-palana (welfare of the governed) to the principle of inclusive development as articulated in contemporary policy discourse. The paper further situates Antyodaya in relation to comparable concepts in modern development theory, including Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, John Rawls's Difference Principle, and the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal of 'Leaving No One Behind.' It argues that while these Western frameworks independently arrive at similar normative conclusions, Antyodaya is philosophically distinctive in grounding the welfare imperative not in contractarian rationality or capability metrics alone, but in the Dharmic obligation of the powerful toward the vulnerable—an obligation understood as constitutive of legitimate governance itself. The paper concludes that Antyodaya, properly understood, offers both a philosophically robust and culturally grounded framework for evaluating development policy in contemporary India.

**Keywords:** *Antyodaya, inclusive development, Deendayal Upadhyaya, Integral Humanism, Rajadharma, Ramarajya, praja-palana, Capability Approach, SDGs, welfare state, Indian political philosophy.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In the discourse of contemporary Indian governance and development policy, few concepts have attracted as much invocation and as little systematic philosophical analysis as Antyodaya. The term—literally meaning 'the rise of the last person'—was introduced into modern political vocabulary by Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya in his lectures on Integral Humanism delivered in 1965, and has since been adopted as the name of flagship welfare programmes of the Government of India. Yet the philosophical depth of the concept, and in particular its roots in the classical Rajadharma tradition of the Indian epics, remains largely unexamined in the academic literature.

This neglect is significant because it reflects a broader tendency in Indian development studies to treat indigenous philosophical traditions as culturally interesting but theoretically peripheral—as background colour to be acknowledged before the 'real' theoretical work begins with Western frameworks. This paper contests that tendency by arguing that Antyodaya represents not a vague or underdeveloped moral intuition but a philosophically precise and historically deep

welfare principle, one that can stand serious comparison with the most sophisticated frameworks in contemporary development ethics.

The argument proceeds in five stages. The first section examines the welfare ideal in the Ramayana—particularly the concept of Ramarajya—as the foundational articulation of praja-palana in the Indian political tradition. The second section analyses the treatment of the ruler's welfare obligations in the Mahabharata's Shantiparva. The third section examines Upadhyaya's Antyodaya as the modern reformulation of this classical welfare principle. The fourth section undertakes a comparative engagement between Antyodaya and three major frameworks in contemporary development theory: Rawls's Difference Principle, Sen's Capability Approach, and the UN's SDG framework. The fifth section addresses the contemporary policy relevance of Antyodaya, with particular reference to welfare programmes in post-independence India. The paper concludes with a reflection on the contribution of this philosophical tradition to ongoing debates about the meaning and measurement of inclusive development.

A note on method is appropriate here. This paper combines textual analysis of primary sources in Sanskrit epic literature with philosophical comparison and normative argument. It does not claim to resolve all questions of textual interpretation or historical attribution; rather, it uses the texts as resources for philosophical reflection, in the tradition of what might be called 'comparative political philosophy' (Patel, 2022; Gupta, 2019). The goal is not antiquarian but practical: to recover and make available for contemporary use a set of philosophical resources that have been underutilised in Indian development discourse.

## 2. RAMRAJYA AND THE WELFARE IDEAL: THE FOUNDATIONAL VISION

The concept of Ramarajya—the kingdom of Rama—has occupied a unique place in Indian political imagination for millennia. It functions simultaneously as a historical ideal, a mythological memory, and a normative standard against which actual governance is measured. Its enduring power lies in the comprehensiveness of its welfare vision: Ramarajya is not merely a state of material prosperity but a condition of total human flourishing encompassing the physical, social, moral, and spiritual dimensions of life.

The Valmiki Ramayana's description of Ramarajya in the Uttara Kanda provides the locus classicus of this vision:

***Na paryadevan vidhva na ca vyalakritam bhayam. (Valmiki Ramayana, Uttara Kanda, 7.89.4–5)***

'No widow wept; no one lived in fear of wild beasts.' This seemingly simple description carries profound political significance. The absence of widows weeping implies the absence of war, arbitrary violence, and premature death—a condition that depends on just governance and the rule of Dharma. The absence of fear implies security for the most vulnerable, including those who cannot defend themselves. Together, these conditions describe a welfare state avant la lettre: a polity in which the security and wellbeing of the weakest members is the primary measure of governance's success.

Tulsidas, in the Ramcharitmanas, extends this vision with his celebrated description:

***Daihik daivik bhautik tapa. Ramarajya nahin kahuhu vyapa. (Tulsidas, Ramcharitmanas, Uttara Kanda, 20.1)***

'In Ramarajya, no one was afflicted by physical suffering, natural calamities, or material want.' The threefold categorisation of suffering—daihik (bodily), daivik (supernatural or natural), bhautik (material)—is philosophically significant. It indicates that the welfare ideal of Ramarajya encompasses not merely economic conditions but the full range of human vulnerability. A governance system that eliminates only material poverty while leaving its citizens prey to disease, natural disaster, social violence, or spiritual emptiness has not achieved the standard of Ramarajya.

The principle underlying this vision is articulated with great precision in the Valmiki Ramayana's formulation: 'Praja sukhe sukhi raja'—'The king's happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects' (Ayodhya Kanda, 2.100.5). This is not merely a pious sentiment; it is a criterion of political legitimacy[1]. The ruler who prioritises his own welfare over that of his subjects has violated the fundamental condition of his office. Governance, on this account, is intrinsically a welfare enterprise: it exists for the sake of the governed, not for the benefit of the governor.

What is particularly striking from a contemporary development perspective is that this welfare standard is applied universally—it encompasses all subjects, not merely the majority or the powerful. The most vulnerable members of society—the widow, the orphan, the weak and defenceless—are explicitly named as the test cases for governance's success. This orientation toward the most marginalised is precisely what Upadhyaya will later formalise as Antyodaya.

## 3.THE WELFARE OBLIGATION IN THE MAHABHARATA'S SHANTIPARVA

While the Ramayana presents the welfare ideal primarily through narrative and exemplary description, the Mahabharata's Shantiparva develops it through systematic argument and philosophical reflection. Bhishma's extended discourse on Rajadharma to the newly crowned Yudhishthira constitutes the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of the ruler's welfare obligations in the Sanskrit epic tradition.

The foundational principle of this discourse is stated with lapidary precision:

***Prjanam tu sukhe raja sukham, natmasukhesukham. (Mahabharata, Shantiparva, 109.11)***

'The king's happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects, not in his own personal happiness.' This formulation goes beyond the Ramayana's 'Praja sukhe sukhi raja' in its explicit contrast between the welfare of subjects and the personal welfare of the ruler. It establishes an anti-egoistic principle at the heart of Rajadharma: the ruler's interests are, by definition, subordinate to those of the governed. This is not merely a counsel of prudence—a recognition that the ruler's long-term interests are best served by attending to his subjects' welfare—but a categorical moral claim about the proper orientation of political authority.

Bhishma elaborates this principle through a series of specific obligations. The ruler must ensure the protection of all subjects without distinction of caste, class, or condition; he must pay particular attention to the destitute, the widowed, the sick, and the disabled; he must maintain granaries and distribute food in times of famine; and he must ensure that taxation does not impoverish those who are already at the margins of subsistence. These are not optional acts of royal generosity but constitutive duties of legitimate kingship2.

Particularly significant from the perspective of Antyodaya is Bhishma's insistence that the ruler bears special responsibility for those who cannot advocate for themselves:

***Anathah pitrimaancha rajaanam manyate praja. Sa taansarvaan paalayitvaa dharmamaapnoti shashvatam. (Mahabharata, Shantiparva, 57.12)***

'The subjects regard the king as their father when they are without a protector. By protecting all of them, he attains eternal Dharma.' The metaphor of the king as father to the fatherless—as protector of those who have no other protector—establishes a priority structure that closely anticipates Upadhyaya's Antyodaya: it is precisely the most marginalised, those without social capital or political voice, who have the strongest claim on the attention and resources of the state.

The Mahabharata also introduces an important consequentialist dimension to the welfare obligation. Bhishma argues that a ruler who neglects the welfare of his subjects will suffer material and spiritual consequences: his kingdom will decline, his authority will erode, and he will accumulate negative karma. But this consequentialist dimension is embedded within a broader deontological framework: the primary reason for attending to the welfare of the marginalised is not fear of consequences but the intrinsic demands of Dharma. The king who fulfils his welfare obligations does so not because it is advantageous but because it is right[3].

## 4. UPADHYAYA'S ANTODAYA: THE MODERN POLICY ARTICULATION

Deendayal Upadhyaya's introduction of Antyodaya as a central principle of Integral Humanism in 1965 must be understood against the background of the specific political and economic context of post-independence India. The Nehruvian development model, dominant since independence, measured developmental success primarily through macroeconomic indicators—GDP growth, industrial output, per capita income—that were largely insensitive to distributive outcomes. The benefits of economic growth, critics increasingly argued, were flowing disproportionately to urban elites and the already-advantaged, while the rural poor, the landless labourer, the tribal, and the Dalit remained in conditions of chronic deprivation.

Upadhyaya's response to this situation was characteristically philosophical before it was political. He argued that the problem was not merely one of mistaken policy but of mistaken measurement—of evaluating governance by the wrong criteria. His proposal was simple but radical: 'The progress of a nation should be measured not by the condition of its most prosperous citizens but by the condition of its most deprived' (Upadhyaya, 1965). This is the core of Antyodaya.

The term itself—Antyodaya, from 'antya' (last, final, lowest) and 'udaya' (rise, ascent)—encapsulates a complete theory of developmental justice. The 'last person' (antyajan) is not merely economically poor; he or she is the person most thoroughly excluded from the benefits of social, economic, and political life—the person whose condition most graphically reveals the failures of existing governance. The rise of this person—his or her inclusion, empowerment, and flourishing—is the criterion by which all governance must be judged.

Upadhyaya grounds this principle not in utilitarian calculus or contractarian rationality but in the Dharmic tradition he has inherited from the epics. The obligation to attend to the most marginalised is, for him, a dimension of the ruler's Dharma—of the moral law that constitutes legitimate governance[4]. He makes this connection explicit when he argues that the concept of the state as seva (selfless service) rather than satta (power) is the distinctive contribution of Indian civilisation to political philosophy:

*Until the last man in our society is able to stand on his feet and live a life of human dignity, the task of those who govern is not complete. (Upadhyaya, 1965)*

This formulation echoes, almost verbatim, the Mahabharata's insistence that the ruler's happiness lies in the happiness of all his subjects—and that the test of that happiness is the condition of the most vulnerable. Upadhyaya is not merely borrowing a rhetorical flourish; he is consciously reactivating a philosophical tradition that he regards as the authentic foundation of Indian political life.

It is worth noting the biographical dimension of Upadhyaya's commitment to Antyodaya. Orphaned at a young age and raised in conditions of material difficulty, he had personal experience of the vulnerability that comes with the loss of social and familial protection. His intellectual commitment to the welfare of the marginalised was reinforced by a lived understanding of what it means to be without a protector—precisely the condition that Bhishma identifies as generating the strongest claim on royal care.

## 5.COMPARATIVE PERSPRECTIVES: ANTYODAYA IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY

### *ANTYODAYA AND RAWL'S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE*

The most frequently noted parallel between Antyodaya and Western political philosophy is with John Rawls's Difference Principle, articulated in A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls argues that social and economic inequalities are just only if they are arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. The structural parallel with Antyodaya is clear: both principles make the condition of the most disadvantaged the central criterion of distributive justice.

However, the differences are as philosophically significant as the similarities. Rawls derives the Difference Principle from behind a hypothetical 'veil of ignorance'—a thought experiment in which rational individuals, not knowing their place in society, would choose principles of justice that protect them in the worst-case scenario[5]. The justification is contractarian and individualist: it appeals to rational self-interest under conditions of uncertainty.

Upadhyaya's Antyodaya, by contrast, is grounded not in hypothetical rational choice but in the Dharmic obligation that flows from the relationship between ruler and ruled, powerful and vulnerable. The obligation to attend to the last person is not derived from what rational individuals would choose behind a veil of ignorance; it is a constitutive feature of legitimate governance, rooted in the moral and cultural tradition of the community. This is a communitarian rather than contractarian justification—and arguably a more robust one, since it does not depend on the abstract fiction of the original position but on the living moral commitments of an actual civilisation.

### *ANTYODAYA AND SEN'S CAPABILITY APPROACH*

A second important comparison is with Amartya Sen's Capability Approach, developed in works including Development as Freedom (1999). Sen argues that development should be understood not as the expansion of income or utility but as the expansion of human capabilities—the real freedoms that people have to live lives they have reason to value. This approach is explicitly critical of GDP-centred development metrics and insists on attending to the capabilities of the most deprived.

The affinity with Antyodaya is profound. Both frameworks insist that the measure of development is not aggregate growth but the condition of the most marginalised. Both recognise that poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon—encompassing not merely material deprivation but the absence of freedom, dignity, education, health, and social participation. And both ground their welfare concern in a respect for the inherent worth of each person.

The difference lies in the philosophical framework within which these insights are embedded. Sen's Capability Approach is grounded in a broadly liberal tradition that emphasises individual agency and the diversity of human values.

Upadhyaya's Antyodaya is grounded in a Dharmic tradition that emphasises the obligations of the community and the state toward its members, and that understands individual flourishing as inseparable from social and cultural embeddedness[6]. These are complementary rather than competing emphases, and there is productive philosophical dialogue to be had between them—a dialogue that, as scholars like Gupta (2019) have noted, has barely begun.

### *ANTYODAYA AND THE SDG FRAMEWORK*

The United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, are organised around the principle of 'Leaving No One Behind'—a commitment to ensuring that the benefits of development reach the most marginalised and excluded populations. This principle is operationalised through disaggregated data collection, targeted interventions for vulnerable groups, and explicit monitoring of progress for the poorest quintile of populations.

The parallel with Antyodaya is striking and has been noted by several scholars of Indian development policy (Singh, 2022). The SDG framework arrives at its welfare orientation through a global policy consensus process; Antyodaya arrives at a structurally similar orientation through philosophical reflection on the Dharmic tradition of the Indian epics. The convergence is not coincidental: it reflects the fact that the moral intuition underlying both frameworks—that governance must be judged by its responsiveness to the most vulnerable—is one of the deepest and most widely shared intuitions in human moral life.

What Antyodaya offers that the SDG framework does not is a philosophical grounding for this intuition that is culturally specific and historically deep. The SDGs are a global policy consensus, and as such they must appeal to the lowest common denominator of cross-cultural agreement; they cannot provide the kind of thick philosophical justification that a specific cultural tradition can offer. Antyodaya, rooted in two and a half millennia of Indian philosophical reflection on the obligations of governance, provides precisely that kind of thick justification—and in so doing, it gives the welfare imperative a motivational force that abstract policy principles often lack[7].

## 6. CONTEMPORARY POLICY RELEVANCE: ANTYODAYA IN POST-INDEPENDENCE INDIA

The influence of Antyodaya on Indian welfare policy has been both direct and indirect. At the direct level, the concept has given its name to several flagship government programmes, most notably the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), launched in 2000, which provides subsidised food grains to the poorest families below the poverty line[8]. The AAY represents an explicit attempt to operationalise Upadhyaya's principle: among all beneficiaries of the public distribution system, it identifies and prioritises the most deprived—the 'antyajan'—for enhanced support.

At the indirect level, the Antyodaya framework has contributed to a broader shift in Indian development discourse toward greater attention to distributive outcomes, social inclusion, and the welfare of marginalised communities. The rights-based approach to development that has characterised major social legislation of the 2000s—including the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005), the Right to Education Act (2009), and the National Food Security Act (2013)—reflects, at least in part, the philosophical legacy of Upadhyaya's insistence that the claims of the most vulnerable are not optional charitable concerns but constitutive obligations of democratic governance.

The concept has also proved valuable as a critical tool for evaluating development outcomes. India's economic growth over the past three decades has been substantial by aggregate measures, but its distribution has been highly unequal. The Antyodaya framework provides a philosophically principled basis for the argument—made by economists, civil society organisations, and social movements alike—that growth that bypasses the most marginalised is not genuine development but its simulacrum. This critical function of Antyodaya is, in a sense, its most important contemporary contribution: it reminds policymakers and citizens that the standard of Ramarajya has not been achieved as long as the last person remains in conditions of deprivation and exclusion[9].

It is worth reflecting briefly on the continuity between this critical function and the Rajadharma tradition from which Antyodaya is derived. When Bhishma instructs Yudhishthira that his happiness must lie in the happiness of all his subjects—and when he identifies the protection of the fatherless and the defenceless as a measure of the ruler's Dharma—he is doing precisely what Upadhyaya does in the post-independence context: he is holding power to account by the standard of its most vulnerable subjects. The tradition of Rajadharma, in this respect, has always been not only a theory of legitimate governance but a resource for its critique[10].

## 7. DISCUSSION: ANTYODAYA AS A DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

The analysis undertaken in the preceding sections establishes, we argue, three main conclusions about the nature and significance of Antyodaya as a contribution to development ethics.

First, Antyodaya is philosophically distinctive in its grounding. Unlike Rawls's Difference Principle, it does not derive the welfare imperative from hypothetical rational choice; unlike utilitarian approaches, it does not justify attention to the marginalised as a means to aggregate welfare maximisation; unlike purely procedural theories of justice, it does not reduce the welfare obligation to the fair application of rules[11]. Instead, it grounds the imperative to attend to the most vulnerable in the Dharmic obligation of the powerful—an obligation that is understood as constitutive of legitimate governance and expressive of the community's deepest moral commitments. This is a philosophically coherent and independently interesting position that deserves to be taken seriously on its own terms in comparative development ethics.

Second, Antyodaya is historically deep. It is not a concept invented ex nihilo by Upadhyaya in 1965 but the modern articulation of a welfare ideal that has roots extending back to the Rajadharma tradition of the Indian epics[12]. This historical depth is philosophically significant: it means that Antyodaya can draw on a rich tradition of reflection, narrative illustration, and practical application that gives it a cultural resonance and motivational force that more recently constructed frameworks often lack. When an Indian policymaker or citizen encounters the concept of Antyodaya, they encounter not merely an abstract principle but a philosophical tradition with which they are already, in some sense, familiar[13].

Third, Antyodaya is practically generative. Its insistence that development be measured by the condition of the most marginalised provides a clear, actionable criterion for policy evaluation that can be applied across a wide range of domains—from food security and healthcare to education, housing, and political participation. Its integration with the SDG framework of 'Leaving No One Behind' suggests that it is capable of dialogue with international development discourse without losing its philosophical distinctiveness[14].

These conclusions do not imply that Antyodaya is without limitations. The most serious is its relative underdevelopment as a theory of social structure. Upadhyaya identifies the condition of the last person as the criterion of governance's success, but he does not provide a systematic analysis of the social, economic, and political structures that produce and reproduce that condition of marginality. A fully adequate welfare philosophy requires not only a criterion of evaluation but an account of causation—an explanation of why some people end up as the 'antyajan' and what structural changes are required to alter their situation[15]. The Antyodaya framework is most powerful as a normative criterion; its development into a full theory of structural transformation remains an agenda for future philosophical and policy work.

## 8. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that Antyodaya—Deendayal Upadhyaya's principle of governance evaluated by the condition of its most marginalised member—is neither an isolated innovation nor a vague moral sentiment, but the modern policy articulation of a welfare ideal deeply embedded in the Rajadharma tradition of the Indian epics. Tracing this lineage from the ideal of Ramarajya in the Valmiki Ramayana through the welfare maxims of the Mahabharata's Shantiparva to Upadhyaya's Integral Humanism, the paper has shown that there exists a continuous and philosophically coherent tradition of thought that makes the condition of the most vulnerable the primary criterion of legitimate governance.

This tradition anticipates, and in important respects surpasses, the major frameworks of contemporary development ethics in the depth of its philosophical grounding, the cultural resonance of its normative commitments, and the clarity of its practical criterion[16]. It does not replace Western frameworks such as the Capability Approach or the SDG principle of 'Leaving No One Behind'; rather, it enriches and complicates them by offering an alternative philosophical foundation—one rooted not in contractarian rationality or capability metrics but in the Dharmic obligations that constitute legitimate governance in the Indian tradition.

The implications for contemporary development policy and scholarship are significant. At the policy level, the Antyodaya framework provides a philosophically principled basis for evaluating welfare programmes by their impact on the most marginalised—a standard that is both more demanding and more culturally resonant than aggregate growth metrics. At the scholarly level, it offers development studies a set of indigenous philosophical resources that have been largely neglected in favour of Western theoretical frameworks.

The ancient injunction of the Mahabharata—'The king's happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects, not in his own personal happiness'—and Upadhyaya's modern reformulation—'Until the last man in our society is able to stand on his feet and live a life of human dignity, the task of those who govern is not complete'—are, at their deepest level, the same claim: that power is legitimate only when it serves the most vulnerable[17]. This claim is as urgent in the twenty-first century as it was in the age of the epics. Recovering its philosophical depth and historical roots is not merely an exercise in intellectual history; it is a contribution to the ongoing project of building a just and inclusive society.

## REFERENCES

1. Dharmasenan, K. (2017). Integral Humanism of Deendayal Upadhyaya: A critical analysis. Indian Political Science Review, 44(2), 112–128.
2. Ganguli, K. M. (2002). The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa. Munshiram Manoharlal.
3. Government of India. (2000). Antyodaya Anna Yojana: Scheme guidelines. Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution.
4. Gupta, A. (2019). Political thought in ancient India. Sage Publications.
5. Kane, P. V. (1973). History of Dharmashastra (Vol. 3). Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
6. Patel, R. (2022). Ethics in ancient Indian politics. Oxford University Press.
7. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press.
8. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Oxford University Press.
9. Sharma, M. C. (2018). Deendayal Upadhyaya: Jivan aur vichar [Life and thought]. Prabhat Prakashan.
10. Sharma, R. S. (1980). A socio-political study of the Valmiki Ramayana. Motilal Banarsidass.
11. Singh, V. (2022). Rajadharma in the Mahabharata and its contemporary relevance. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 50(3), 345–368.
12. Tulsidas. (1574). Ramcharitmanas. Gita Press.
13. United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations General Assembly.
14. Upadhyaya, D. (1965). Integral Humanism. Bharatiya Jana Sangh.
15. Upadhyaya, D. (2016). Sampurna vangmaya [Complete works] (Vols. 1–15). Prabhat Prakashan.
16. Valmiki. (1960–1971). Valmiki Ramayana: Critical edition (G. H. Bhatt, Ed.). Oriental Institute.
17. Vyasa. (1966). Mahabharatam (V. S. Sukthankar et al., Eds.). Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.